2 to a use of force are submitted to a more lenient legal regime than other forms of the use of force in international relations. Finally, the article explores the legality of counterproliferation cyber operations from the perspective of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and in particular of the resolutions adopted against Iran by the Security Council. The article concludes that the legality of counterproliferation cyber operations must be assessed in the light of the general primary and secondary rules of international law: neither the means used (cyber instead of kinetic) nor the aim pursued (the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons) justify a special legal regime.
Introduction
In September 2010, it was reported that a computer worm, named Stuxnet, had attacked Iran's industrial infrastructure with the alleged ultimate purpose of sabotaging the gas centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, where the Islamic Republic is suspected of conducting a military nuclear programme that may lead to a violation of its obligations under Article II of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In October 2011, other malware, dubbed DuQu, was discovered: its code had striking similarities with Stuxnet although its payload was not designed to cause physical damage but to obtain information that could be used to attack industrial control systems. <www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossie r.pdf>. Iran claims that its uranium enrichment programme is for purely civilian purposes.
relevant circumstances precluding wrongfulness.
10
The article starts by distinguishing between cyber attacks and cyber exploitation and by discussing their respective possible role as counterproliferation measures.
11
It subsequently analyses whether and under what conditions counterproliferation cyber operations can be justified as countermeasures. Section 4 investigates whether counterproliferation cyber operations amounting to a use of force are submitted to a more lenient legal regime than other forms of the use of force in international relations and whether Stuxnet could be qualified as a self-defence measure. Finally, Section 5 examines the legality of counterproliferation cyber operations from the perspective of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and in particular of the resolutions adopted against Iran by the Security Council. Cyber operations conducted by States include both cyber attacks and cyber exploitation.
Cyber Attacks, Cyber Exploitation and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

12
Cyber attacks could be standalone operations or be used in conjunction with a subsequent kinetic or cyber attack, and could occur in peacetime as well as in time of armed conflict.
13
A cyber attack may go from relatively innocuous operations such as website defacement to acts that cause havoc in military campaigns by generating misinformation, or acts resulting in major disruption of services and even physical damage to property, loss of lives and bodily injury. In all cases, a cyber attack involves an action, either in offence or in defence, delivered in or through cyberspace, that targets either an information system or an infrastructure control system. 14 The former contains information but do not operate physical infrastructures, hence an attack on them causes loss, alteration or corruption of data but does not directly result in loss of functionality or material damage. The latter, of which a common type is Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, operate infrastructures: if corrupted, the consequence may be malfunction or even physical damage.
15
For security reasons, SCADAs, including that used at Natanz, are normally 'air gapped' from the internet and the attack can only be delivered from within the closed network or through local installation of malware by agents that have close access to the system, for instance through flash drives.
Cyber exploitation is hereby intended as the unauthorized access to computers, computer systems or networks in order to exfiltrate information, but without affecting the functionality of the accessed system or altering, deleting or corrupting the data or software resident therein.
16
As has been observed, '[t] he primary technical difference between cyber attack and cyberexploitation is in the nature of the payload to be executed -a cyber attack payload is destructive whereas a cyberexploitation payload acquires information nondestructively.'
17
Although they are often labeled in the press as 'cyber attacks', then, cyber exploitation operations are different in that they do not affect the system's operation. They focus on intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance rather than on disruption and can be preliminary to a kinetic or cyber attack that they aim to enable, for instance by collecting information about the architecture of the attacked network (network mapping) or operating system (footprinting) or by identifying previously unknown vulnerabilities. data or intellectual property from governments and corporations could also be an aim in itself and is a major threat to national security and commerce.
19
Both cyber attacks and cyber exploitation could be employed as counterproliferation tools in alternative to, or together with, more traditional means.
Cyber attacks, for instance, could be used to incapacitate the air defence networks of the proliferator in support of aerial monitoring of compliance with non-proliferation agreements.
20
Cyber attacks could also be used to enable a subsequent kinetic attack for counterproliferation purposes, as in the case of Israel's bombing of a Syrian nuclear facility in 2007, which was preceded by a cyber attack that neutralized ground radars and anti-aircraft batteries.
21
Finally, States could conduct cyber attacks to directly damage or disrupt the facilities where nuclear weapons are being manufactured or, if the State in question has already acquired nuclear weapons, to attack other national critical infrastructure (NCI) in order to persuade it to disarm. Stuxnet was allegedly designed to 19 As has been noted, 'the cyber context changes the scale and consequences of theft and espionage to a degree that can result in harm to the country at least as severe as a physical attack.'(J Goldsmith, 'How Cyber Changes the Laws of War' (2013) 24 EJIL 133). As a consequence of the cyber intrusions allegedly originating from China, the US government adopted a new strategy to combat intellectual slow down Iran's nuclear programme by affecting the gas centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. Unlike other malware, the worm did not limit itself to selfreplicate, but also contained a 'weaponised' payload designed to give instructions to other programs 22 and is, in fact, the first known use of malicious software designed to produce material damage by attacking the SCADA system of a NCI.
23
Stuxnet presumably infiltrated the Natanz system through laptops and USB drives as, for security reasons, the system is not usually connected to the internet, and had two components: one designed to force a change in the centrifuges' rotor speed, inducing excessive vibrations or distortions that would destroy the centrifuges, and one that recorded the normal operations of the plant and then sent them back to plant operators so to make it look as everything was functioning normally.
24
Although the exact consequences of the incident are still the object of debate, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that, in the period when Stuxnet was active, Iran stopped feeding uranium into a significant number of gas centrifuges at Natanz. 
Cyber Operations as Countermeasures Against the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Even when inconsistent with certain primary norms, the illegality of the counterproliferation cyber operations might be precluded if they amount to The invocation of countermeasures as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, however, is subordinated to the presence of certain requirements that will be examined in the following pages.
A. The Previous Commission of an Internationally Wrongful Act by the Targeted State
To be lawful, countermeasures can only be undertaken by the injured State(s) in reaction to a previous internationally wrongful act attributable to the targeted State. If one accepts the interpretation according to which it is only the obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and not also that to comply with it, which has been collectivized through Article III of the NPT, the obligation to fully apply safeguards is of a bilateral character. In such case, the only party injured by its violation would be the IAEA, with which the agreement was concluded. As has been observed, 'just as for States, whether an organization is an injured subject depends on the participation of the organization in a primary legal relationship', which is certainly the case 'where the breached obligation results from a bilateral treaty to which the when it is obligations contained in other non-proliferation treaties that are allegedly breached, the conclusion may be different. These conclusions apply even more strongly to Israel, which is not even a State Party to the NPT.
C. Conditions Related to the Adoption of Countermeasures
States adopting countermeasures also have to comply with the requirements provided in exploitation.
86
Stuxnet is a good example of such customized cyber operations. Unlike most malware, Stuxnet did little harm to computers and networks that did not meet specific configuration requirements. While the worm was promiscuous, it made itself inert if the specific Siemens software used at Iran's Natanz enrichment plant was not found on infected computers, and contained safeguards to prevent each infected computer from spreading the worm to more than three others. The worm was also programmed to erase itself on 24 June 2012. This point will be explored in the next Section.
Counterproliferation Cyber Operations Amounting to a Use of Force
It is outside the scope of this study to engage in an in-depth discussion of when cyber operations amount to a use of force under Article 2 (4) been extensively done elsewhere.
89
In two articles published in a special issue on 'cyber war' of this Journal, Russell Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias speak for numerous scholars when they argue that, if a cyber operation causes physical damage to property or persons, it would qualify as a use of force.
90
If it was proved that Stuxnet did cause physical damage to the gas centrifuges at Natanz and significantly disrupted the functioning of the facility, then, it could hardly be doubted that it qualified as a use of force under Article 2(4), although arguably not of a scale and effects to also be an 'armed attack' under Article 51. opines that 'there is no reason to assume that the threat will always be unlawful if in the same circumstances the resort to force would be illicit'.
93
Taking State practice into account, in particular the lack of significant reactions to threats of force, she concludes that Article 2(4) is not the only parameter against which the legality of a threat of force is assessed by States, which consider threats lawful if: 1) they are made to protect the security of the State, providing that the internal self-determination of the target is not violated; 2) they are made to vindicate a denied right; 3) they are prudent and balance individual and community values.
94
If the main purpose of the Charter is the preservation of peace and security and not the freedom of States from external pressure and if '[t] he Charter prohibits the use of force in violation of the political independence and territorial integrity of a state because it may lead to international instability, breach of the peace and/or massive abuses of human rights', then there is no reason why the threat and the use of force should be treated equally.
95
The legal appraisal of the threat would be the same as that of the use of force only when they produce comparable results, which is not a likely case, as 'even an effective threat will not have the same destructive consequences as the use of force'.
96
Many of Sadurska's arguments in relation to threats of force could be easily extended to cyber attacks when used to enforce international law, in particular nonproliferation obligations, because of their potentially less lethal character: even when they cause some material damage as in the case of Stuxnet, cyber attacks can cause fewer human casualties (if any) than a kinetic attack. It has been claimed, for instance, that the Stuxnet operation was a 'huge success' because it was 'nearly as effective as a military strike, but even better since there were no fatalities and no full-blown war'.
97
Cyber operations might then come to be seen as a more subtle approach to pursue community objectives such as nuclear weapons counterproliferation and a 'greater opportunity to achieve goals such as retarding the Iranian nuclear programme without causing the loss of life or injury to innocent civilians that air strikes would seem more likely to inflict'.
98
This argument seems to find support in the fact that, even though Stuxnet has allegedly damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, there was no significant reaction to it, by the victim State, by those suspected of having planned and executed the operation or by the international community in general. One commentator has maintained that this silence can be interpreted as acquiescence suggesting that 'states don't perceive this situation triggered the rules on the use of force, armed attack, and aggression' even though, had the attack been carried out by kinetic means, it would have probably been treated differently. that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal -for whatever reason -the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the Charter'.
102
There is also ample practice that proves that States consider the threat of force prohibited under the same circumstances as the use of force, even if they do not cause direct physical damage.
103
It is also not correct that Stuxnet met with no reaction. Iran, in particular, qualified the cyber attack as 'nuclear terrorism' and as 'a grave violation of the principles of the UN Charter and international law', even though it refrained from using explicit jus ad 100 Ibid, 74-75.
101 Sadurska (n 92) 246.
102 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 47) para 47.
bellum language.
104
It also encouraged the Security Council 'to act against those States undertaking cyber attacks and sabotage in the peaceful nuclear facilities'.
105
But even be that as it may, from a purely methodological perspective silence cannot be interpreted as acquiescence in the present case as no State openly acknowledged the responsibility of Stuxnet or offered legal justifications for it. It is more likely that the lack of significant reactions by the international community was due to non-legal factors. In particular, many regional States were certainly not unhappy that Iran's nuclear programme had been delayed. Silence might have also been due to the lack of reliable information about the incident and its actual consequences, as well as its uncertain attribution. States might have also preferred not to condemn the cyber operation as a 'use of force' because they are engaging or wish to engage in similar operations themselves. Finally, the absence of has no basis in international law. 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) .
Counterproliferation Cyber Operations and the UN Collective Security System
124 SC Resolution 1737 (2006 , adopted under Art 41, requires Member States to block the import or export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment and to freeze the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. The sanctions regime provided in Resolution 1737 has been integrated and extended in subsequent resolutions (SC Resolutions 1747 (2007 ), 1803 (2008 ), 1835 (2008 ), 1929 (2010 
Conclusions
Recent cyber operations that allegedly targeted the Iranian nuclear programme epitomize the possible use of cyber measures for nuclear counterproliferation purposes.
The legality of such operations must be assessed in the light of the general primary and secondary rules of international law: neither the means used (cyber instead of kinetic)
nor the aim pursued (the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) justify a special legal regime. While it may be uncertain that Flame and DuQu, that aimed at gathering intelligence and did not cause physical damage or disruption of services, were internationally wrongful act, the unlawful character of Stuxnet can hardly be and Mexico (ibid, 14) .
law. Finally, Chapter VII of the UN Charter cannot be invoked to justify the operation:
none of the resolutions sanctioning Iran that have been adopted by the Security Council make any reference to cyber operations or authorize Member States to use 'all necessary means' to ensure compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreements.
Apart from any considerations on its legality, it seems that, all in all, Stuxnet was of limited use as counterproliferation measure, as it neither caused a significant shutdown of enrichment processes nor had a permanent impact on the centrifuges.
127
On the other hand, the operation might have hampered the negotiations for a diplomatic solution of the crisis that were under way at the time the worm was discovered.
128
In the long-term, Iran might have even taken advantage of the incident in order to improve its active and passive cyber defences and repel further cyber attacks on its critical infrastructures.
129
127 Barzashka (n 3) 52-54, who however concedes that Stuxnet 'might have temporarily slowed down Iran's rate of expansion' of its enrichment programme (ibid, 54; emphasis in the original).
128 Ibid.
